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Abstract
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a contactless, automatic identification wire-
less technology primarily used for identifying and tracking of objects, goods and humans.
RFID is not only limited to identification and tracking applications. This proliferating
wireless technology has been deployed in numerous securities sensitive applications e.g. ac-
cess control, e-passports, contactless payments, driver license, transport ticking and health
cards.
RFID inherits all the security and privacy problems that are related to wireless technol-
ogy and in addition to those that are specific to RFID systems. The security and privacy
protection schemes proposed in literature for wireless devices are mostly secured through
symmetric/asymmetric keys encryption/decryption and hash functions. The security of
all these cryptographic algorithms depends on computationally complex problems that
are hard to compute using available resources. However, these algorithms require cryp-
tographic operations on RFID tags which contradict the low cost demand of RFID tags.
Due to limited number of logic gates in tags, i.e., 5K-10K, these methods are not practical.
Much research effort has done in attempt to solve consumer’s privacy and security problem.
Solutions that prevent clandestine inventory are mostly application layer techniques.
To solve this problem, a new RFID physical layer scheme has been proposed namely
Direct Sequence Backscatter Encryption (DSB Enc). The proposed scheme uses level
generator to produce different levels before transmitting the signal to the tag. The tag
response to the signal sent by the reader using backscatter communications on the same
signal which looks random to the eavesdropper. Therefore eavesdropper cannot extract
the information from reader to tag and tag to reader communication using passive eaves-
dropping. As reader knows the different generated levels added to the carrier signal, it can
remove the levels and retrieve the tag’s messages.
We proposed a lightweight, low-cost and practically secure physical layer security to
the RFID system, for a supply chain processing application, without increasing the com-
putational power and tag’s cost. The proposed scheme was validated by simulations on
GNU Radio and experimentation using SDR and a WISP tag. Our implementation and
experimental results validate that DSB Enc is secure against passive eavesdropping, replay
and relay attacks. It provides better results in the presence of AWGN channel.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is a contactless, automatic identification wireless
technology primarily used for identifying and tracking of objects, goods and humans. This
proliferating wireless technology is not only limited to identification and tracking appli-
cations but has been deployed in numerous securities sensitive applications, e.g., access
control, e-passports, contactless payments, driver license, transport ticking and health
cards as well [51, 66].
Conventionally, barcodes are used for keeping track of large number of objects, but they
have been replaced by RFID tags in some products. RFID has superiority over bar-codes
as they can detect massive objects individually, without line of sight (LOS), through non-
conducting materials and contain much more information than merely a unique identifier
for an object. Despite these benefits RFID devices (tags) are under threat of clandestine
inventory.
RFID inherits all the security and privacy problems that are related to wireless tech-
nology in addition to those that are specific to RFID systems. The security and pri-
vacy protection schemes proposed in literature for wireless devices are mostly secured
through symmetric keys encryption/decryption, hash functions and asymmetric keys en-
cryption/decryption. The security of all these cryptographic algorithms depends on compu-
tationally complex problems that are hard to compute using available resources. However,
these algorithms require cryptographic operations on RFID tags which contradicts the low
cost demand of these tags. Due to limited number of logic gates in tags, i.e., 5K-10K, these
methods are not practical. Much research has been done in attempt to solve consumer’s
privacy and security problem [12]. Solutions that prevent clandestine inventory are mostly
application layer techniques [28, 35, 64].
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Considering different security encryption/decryption schemes proposed by scholars at
the expense of tag cost, the de facto standard for passive RFID systems, called EPCglobal
UHF Class-1 Generation-2 (C1 Gen2) [53], doesn’t include encryption/decryption as a
part. They do not prevent other attacks that are specifically targeted to passive RFID
tags. All these protocols have shown some weakness over the time [28]. Many attacks
have shown that these application layer security can be by passed easily using relay attack,
replay attack, brute-force attack, passive eavesdropping as well as active eavesdropping
[10, 50, 17, 19].
1.1 Contribution
To solve this problem, a new RFID physical layer scheme has been proposed. The proposed
scheme uses level generator to produce different levels before transmitting the signal to the
tag. The tag responds to the signal sent by the reader using backscatter communications on
the same signal which looks random to the eavesdropper. Therefore eavesdropper cannot
extract the information from reader to tag and tag to reader communications using passive
eavesdropping. As only the legitimate reader knows the different generated levels added
to the carrier signal, it can remove the levels and retrieve tag’s messages.
We propose a lightweight, low-cost and practically secure physical layer security to the
RFID system, for a supply chain processing application, without increasing the compu-
tational power and tag’s cost. The proposed scheme is validated by simulations on GNU
Radio and experimentation using software defined radio (SDR) and a WISP tag. Our
implementation and experimental results validate that DSB Enc is secure against pas-
sive eavesdropping, replay and relay attacks. It provides better results in the presence of
AWGN channel.
1.2 Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follow. Chapter 2 gives an overview of fundamentals
and background knowledge required for this thesis. Notation used in the thesis and prelim-
inaries are defined in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 gives an review the historical background and
evolution of Software Defined Radio, GNU Radio and Universal Software Radio Peripheral
(USRP). Related work is discussed in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we introduce our physical
layer approach for securing RFID systems using levels generator. It includes experimental
setup, simulation and proof-of-concept. Section 6 discusses robustness of the proposed
2
scheme against existing attacks. Chapter 7 provides the security analysis of the level gen-
erator; other methods of implementing level generator; results of passive eavesdropping
and measures against known existing attacks on low cost RFID passive tags. Chapter 8
concludes the thesis with the summary of the thesis and potential future applications.
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Chapter 2
Background and Fundamentals
In this chapter, we will give the overview of the RFID system architecture and the physical
layer characteristics used in different RFID standards. We will also discuss various privacy
and security concerns in RFID systems.
2.1 RFID Architecture
An RFID system consists of RFID devices (Tags), Readers or interrogators and Back-end
system or database. The general RFID architecture is shown in Figure 2.1.
2.1.1 Tags
Tags are embedded in all objects that are to be identified in RFID systems. Modern tag
contains an Integrated Circuit (IC) chip with computational and storage capabilities and
an antenna coil or coupling element for communications. The resources available to the
tag varies depending on its power source and type. Tags can be mainly categorized into
three types depending on the power source, i.e., active, passive and semi-passive tags.
• Active Tags have on board power source and much higher computational and stor-
age capabilities, e.g., NFC enabled cell phones and an embedded RFID wireless sensor
nodes.
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Figure 2.1: General Architecture of RFID System
• Passive Tags do not have internal power source. They harvest power from the
reader’s signal. These tags cannot perform complex computations due to power
limitation. They harvest power when they come in the vicinity of reader’s signal
and store that power which depletes very rapidly. The power used for transmitting
signal, from tag to reader communication, is inversely proportional to the square of
the distance between the reader and the tag.
• Semi-passive Tags lie between the active and passive tags. They use battery
power for computation and harvest energy from reader’s signal for communications,
e.g., Automated toll payment tags
2.1.2 Readers
An RFID reader or interrogator is a transceiver which sends commands to the tags and
receives data from them. There are two types of readers:
1. Portable readers, i.e., NFC enabled cell phones acts as RFID reader’s mode. These
readers have power limitation which restricts their operation range.
2. Fixed readers have much higher capability of storage and processing range. Both
readers talk to the database through a secured link which is not considered as part
of RFID security vulnerability.
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Figure 2.2: Signal and data flow in digital communication
2.1.3 Back-end Database:
Reader queries the tags for public IDs and then retrieve the private data corresponding to
that ID from a secure database. This reduces the tag cost and helps in managing the data.
2.1.4 Physical Layer
Digital communication system consists of three main components, i.e., signal processing
(line coding), communication channel and modulator/demodulator as shown in Figure 2.2.
Similarly for an RFID system, in order to communicate on a physical layer it must have
these three basic functional blocks. To transmit message over an RF channel the message
source must be first encoded. The encoded signal influences the electromagnetic waves
of a particular carrier depending on type of modulation used in a system. In digital
communications, the signal can be represented as ‘1’ and ‘0’ in various line codes. RFID
systems use one of the following schemes: Non-Return-Zero (NRZ), Manchester, Unipolar
RZ, Differential Bi-Phase (DBP), Miller, Modified Miller, differential coding on Pulse Pause
(PP) coding. Line coding (signal coding) used in an RFID system greatly depend on the
boundary conditions.
Line Coding
Line coding is used for clock synchronization, elimination of DC component and can help
in data recovery. Various line coding schemes used in RFID systems are shown in Figure
2.3.
• Non-Return-to-Zero (NRZ): Binary bits ‘1’ and ‘0’ are mapped onto high signal
‘+1’ and low signal ‘-1’ respectively for one bit period. If NRZ encoding is used with
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Figure 2.3: Signal Coding in Baseband
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100% ASK the tag can not harvest the power through the carrier. Even if 33% ASK
is used with long zero run sequence, it would interrupt the power. Therefore, it is
used with FSK and PSK modulations.
• Miller: A binary bit ‘1’ is encoded to half bit positive/negative edge transition and
bit ‘0’ is represented by the continuance of the preceding signal level of a bit period.
An initial reference is taken for starting bit of the sequence and the following bits are
mapped onto high signal and low signal depending on the combinations of preceding
and current bits. If ‘1’ bit is followed by ‘1’, the half bit edge transition would be
converted to its inverse transition. If ‘0’ bit is followed by ‘0’, inverse transition
occurs at the start of bit period.
In EPC Class-1 Generation-2 UHF RFID protocol tag to reader communication uses
a modified miller sub-carrier coding [53]. A bit ‘0’ is always encoded with low pulse
at the start of a bit period and bit ‘1’ is encoded with low pulse with a delay of
half bit period. Miller modulated sub-carrier encoding uses 2, 4 or 8 cycles of a sub-
carrier square wave for each bit period. The modified Miller encoding transitions are
indicated by phase shifts of 180◦ in the sub-carrier. Each sub-carrier is modulated
with ASK or PSK on another carrier.
• Manchester: A low to high transition and high to low transition represents bits
’1’ and ’0’ receptively. All these transitions occurs in the middle of a cycle at each
transition, which helps in data clock recovery. Manchester coding techniques utilizes
twice the bandwidth of NRZ with exclusively no DC component.
• Pulse Position: Pulse Position Modulation (PPM) encodes m message bits in one
of the 2m time slots. PPM is suitable for reader to tag communications since the
decoding circuit is extremely simple, which results in small and light weight tags.
• Pulse Interval Encoding: In Pulse Interval Encoding (PIE), also known as pulse-
pause coding, a bit ‘1’ is represented by a pause of 2t before the next bit period and
a bit ‘0’ is represented by a pause of t before the next bit period where t is a unit
time duration varying from 6.35µs to 25µs also known as Tari (Type A reference
interval) as shown in Figure 2.4. PIE is used in EPC C1 Gen2 UHF RFID protocol
from reader to tag communications [53]. The advantage of using PIE from reader to
tag data communication is that there is a continuous flow of power supply to the tag.
• FM0 Encoding: FM0 encoding is a bi-phase-space encoding. In FM0 encoding, a
bit ‘1’ encodes to a constant signal level and a bit ‘0’ encodes to transition in the
middle of a bit period. FM0 inverts the phase at the boundary of each bit period.
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Figure 2.4: Baseband waveform of Pulse Interval Encoding [53]
FM0 encoding is used in tag to reader communications in EPC C1 Gen2 UHF RFID
protocol [53]. Since there is transition in each bit period in FM0, data clock is
embedded in it and can be recovered easily.
Modulation
Modulation is a process of sending the baseband data signal by varying the characteristics of
a periodic electromagnetic wave (carrier signal). A sinusoidal carrier can be characterized
by
x(t) = Ai sin(2pifct+ φi) (2.1)
From equation (2.1), the different carriers can be generated by varying the carrier’s
amplitude Ai, frequency fc and phase φi to represent the baseband data signal. In HF
and UHF RFID systems, digital modulations schemes are used, i.e., Amplitude Shift Key-
ing (ASK), Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) and Phase Shift Keying (PSK). Examples of
modulation schemes used in ISO 14443 and EPC UHF C1 Gen2 are shown in Figure 2.5.
In ISO 14443 framework, type A uses 100% ASK modulation at 13.56 MHz and a sub-
carrier at 847 kHz with a modified miller encoding. Type B uses BPSK modulation at
same frequency as type A with NRZ-L encoding. In UHF C1 Gen2 standard, reader to tag
communications use 30% to 100% ASK (DSB-ASK, SSB-ASK, PR-ASK ) at 902-928 MHz
divided into channels (200kHz, 500kHz) with PIE encoding. Tag to reader communications
use ASK or PSK with FM0 or Modified Miller encoding. For conducting experiments, we
have chosen 100% ASK with NRZ-L encoding.
Figure 2.6 shows the UHF C1 Gen2 standard RFID reader and tag communications.
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(a) (b) 
(c) 
Figure 2.5: (a) Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK or OOK ) (b) Frequency Shift Keying (FSK )
(c) Phase Shift Keying (PSK )
(a) Reader command and tag response (b) Message exchage between reader and tag
Figure 2.6: UHF C1 Gen2 standard RFID communications [5]
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2.2 Vulnerability of RFID System Security
2.2.1 Privacy and Security Issues
RFID system is still passing through its developing phase. Many concerns have been
expressed regarding the risks and threats of RFID systems. With the wide adoption of
RFID technology, it has raised many security and privacy issues.
2.2.2 Privacy
• Tracking Problem: Adversary A` can send beacon signals to query tag multiples
time through different locations and distances, keeps a record of all the data sets
it received from tag at particular time t and further using these data points to
trace/track the movements of an individual while keeping his identity secret. These
patterns can also be used for backward/forward tracing/tracking. Backward tracing
reveals the secret information before time t. Similarly, forward tracing provides secret
information after time t.
• Inventory Problem: As RFID tags also carry personal information of the user,
e.g., mental health record in health card, confidential information in driving license, e-
passport and credit cards, an adversary A´ can get all the stored personal information
apart from unique identification number of tag. EPC tag has four memory banks
carrying additional information. They are Tag Identification (TID), Reserved, EPC
and User [60]. Therefore a person carry EPC tag is subjected to inventory problem.
2.2.3 Security
• Passive Eavesdropping: Eavesdropper (ξ) listens to the communications between
legitimate reader and the tag without participating in the conversation hence securing
its identity. Such kinds of attacks are the biggest threat to RFID systems. As the
system cannot detect the presence of an ξ. These attacks give rise to many other
attacks.
• Active Eavesdropping: Espionage is not only passive it can also be active. In an
active eavesdropping, ξ actively sends query to the tag from a longer distance. Such
kind of attacks can be used in different scenarios.
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• Replay Attack: ξ listen to the communication between reader and the tag for many
sessions. This eavesdropping can be passive/attack. Later replay the previously
collected data to the legitimate reader to breach the security of the system.
• Relay Attack: The most strongest and unavoidable attack in RFID systems is a
relay attack. Relay attack by passes all forms of authentication and authorization
protocols. Even the most secured cryptographic protocols and primitives cannot
avoid this attack. In relay attack an adversary relays the messages between the
reader and the tag. RFID challenge-response protocol can easy be relayed using two
NFC-enabled cell phones [17, 19].
• Man-In-The-Middle Attack: Unlike relay attack, ξ not only relays the messages
between the reader and the tag in MITM attack. Instead he modifies the relayed
messages to recover the secret information or may harm the tag by sending the kill
command to the tag. Such kind of attacks can be used to attack the back-end system,
e.g., database injection.
• Denial of Service: A´ tries to desynchronize/sabotage the communication by jam-
ming the signals from the reader or by sending fake messages to the system. As a
result, the system would not give access to the legitimate tag. Such kind of attacks
are serious threat to military/medical applications.
• Side channel Attack: A´ gets hold of the RFID device physically and tries to get
the secret information/key by analyzing the power traces and exploiting the physical
implementation weakness in the cryptographic algorithms. Side channel attacks are
mainly divided into four categories, i.e., timing attack, fault attack, power analysis
attack and electromagnetic attack.
• Brute force Attack: Most of the securing techniques in RFID systems involve
application layer cryptography, i.e., symmetric/asymmetrical keys. But due to stor-
age and computational limitation of these devices brute force attack are practical. ξ
searches for the required key by looking through a whole search space.
Ideally, an RFID system should be able to prevent all of above mentioned attacks. But
such a system does not exists in reality. There is no solution that can prevent all of these
security and privacy issues all together. Therefore, we expect a security model which could
mitigate as many problems as possible. In Chapter 7, we would compare different attacks
against our proposed scheme.
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Chapter 3
Preliminaries
This chapter defines the list of notations, definitions and fundamental background infor-
mation essential for later chapters.
3.1 Notations
We will use the following notions throughout the thesis
• A´ represents an Adversary in the system.
• Rˇ represents legitimate Reader.
• Tˇ represents legitimate passive Tag.
• ξ represents passive Eavesdropper in the system.
• E´ represents passive eavesdropper’s receiver in the system.
• F represents finite field.
• F2 = GF (2) represents finite field with 2 elements: 0 and 1.
• F2p = GF (2p) represents extension field of GF (2) with 2p elements. Each element in
this field is represented as a p bit binary vector.
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3.2 Backscatter Communications
The basic principle on which passive RFID system works is similar to radar principle in
which the reader sends RF signal to the passive tag. Passive tag harvests power from
the incident continuous wave sent by the reader to communicate in both directions. The
readers send amplitude modulated carrier given by
CW (t) = A(t) cos(2pifit+ θ) (3.1)
where A(t) is the amplitude of the carrier wave, fi is the carrier frequency ∈ {f1, ..., fk}
and θ is a phase of a carrier signal.
This CW is rectified at the tag and supplies power to the tag. Tag decodes the reader’s
command if any using envelope detector. After transmitting the command, the reader keeps
A(t) at high amplitude while waiting for the tag response. In EPC C1 Gen2 [53], tag could
reply on the same CW with ASK or PSK modulations using FM0 or Miller sub-carrier
encoding schemes with clock recovery information embedded in it. Tag backscatters the en-
coded responses mixed with CW by changing the reflection coefficient of the antenna. The
received signal is detected using matched filter and the backscattered signal’s amplitude is
compared to a threshold.
3.3 Power Distance Relationship
The power received at the input of receiver antenna is expressed in terms of transmitted
power of transmission antenna separated at a distance of R in free space model by Friis
equation:
Pr = PtGrGt
(
λ
4piR
)2
(3.2)
where
Pr is the received power
Pt is the transmitted power
Gr is the receiver antenna gain
Gt is the transmitter antenna gain
λ is the carrier wavelength and
R is the distance between transmitter and receiver.
Eq.(3.2) is the simplest form of Friis equation when there is no polarization mismatch
between transmitter and receiver.
14
Two Path Model: Far field communications can be modeled with two path propagation
model in which there is one line of sight (LOS) path and other is the reflected path [65].
At small distance the received power Pr is proportional to
1
R2
, in symbol Pr ∝ 1
R2
. Above
some critical distance Rc, the received power is given by
Pr ≈ PtGrGt
(
hthr
R2
)2
(3.3)
where ht and hr are the transmitter antenna and receiver antenna heights with respect to
ground. Remark: Above Rc, Pr ∝ 1
R4
and independent of the carrier frequency.
3.4 Pseudorandom Sequence Generator
A sequence in which the complete knowledge of previous output bits does not assist in
predicting the next bit with a probability better than half is called truly random sequence.
A random sequences are produced by using two different approaches. The first approach
to generate random bits is from truly random source, i.e., tossing a coin or extracting in-
formation from noise process in communication system. The other approach is to produce
random bits by using deterministic algorithms. The binary sequences generated by deter-
ministic algorithm are called pseudorandom sequences and the deterministic algorithm is
called a pseudorandom sequence generator (PRSG).
The sequence produced by using truly random source does not guarantee the required
statistic characters and mathematical properties which are essential for reliable and secure
communications.
3.4.1 Linear Feedback Shift Register with Maximum Period
A shift register whose feedback function is a linear function is called linear feedback shift
register (LFSR). If the feedback function f(x0, x1, ..., xn−1) is a linear function, i.e., if it
can be expressed as
f(x0, x1, ..., xn−1) = c0x0 + c1x1 + ...+ cn−1xn−1, ci ∈ F, (3.4)
then the recursive relation becomes the following linear recursive relation
ak+n =
n−1∑
i=0
ciak+i, k = 0, 1, .... (3.5)
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Thus feedback shift register is called linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and the output
sequence is called a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) sequence.
A sequence with period 2n−1 generated by an n-stage LFSR is called a maximal length
sequence, or m-sequence [20].
3.5 Complexity of Finite Sequences
Complexity of the given finite sequence depends on the randomness or uncertainty/entropy
of the sequence. Kolmogorov in [31] has proposed an algorithm for shortest Turing machine
program in which when fed with an object x produces the exact same sequence y as a
measure of complexity of that sequence. The entropy of the sequence is measured by the
amount of information conveyed by the produced sequence y about the object x (initial
seed) which generates the specific sequence. Lempel and Ziv in [33] has proposed an
approach for measuring the complexity of finite sequences.
Let S be a sequence of production process with m steps, i.e., S(1, hi), i = 1, 2, ...,m
which are the states of the process. The parsing of S is given by
H(S) = S(1, h1)S(h1 + 1, h2), ..., S(hm−1, hm) (3.6)
which is called the production of S and m initial states S(1, hi) are called the components
or history of H(S). Let c(S) define the complexity of production a sequence (S) and cH(S)
denotes the number of components in the history H(S) of S. Then
c(S) = min{cH(S)} (3.7)
where minimization is over the complete history of S. Therefore, c(S) is the minimum
number of steps in a process required to generate the S according to the rule of production.
The aforementioned notion of complexity of finite sequence can be linked with pseudo-
random sequences. In feedback shift registers the complexity of a sequence is defined in
term of linear span or (linear complexity). Linear complexity defined as a shortest linear
feedback shift register (LFSR) which generates the same sequence.
According to (3.6), in this case, the entropy of a finite sequence is the same as the least
number of bits required to produce the specific sequence, which is equal to the length of
the shortest LFSR which produces the sequence. In other words, the entropy of a finite
sequence is equal to the linear span of the sequence. Thus the entropy of variable x is
given by
H(x) = log2N , x ∈ X, |X| = N . (3.8)
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Example: For an m-sequence of length 2m − 1, the complexity of the sequence will be
H(x) = log2(2
m − 1) ≈ m.
3.6 Definitions
3.6.1 Histogram
Histogram is defined as the graphical representation of distributed data that is an estimate
of probability distribution of continuous variable.
3.6.2 Quantization
The process of mapping the large range of values of a wave into finite set of values. Each
level in the finite range set is called level of quantization. The device that converts the
analogue signal into digital is called quantizer. The difference between the actual value
and quantized value is known as the quantization error. Quantization error occurs due
to the finite level of quantizations and cannot be more accurate than ± 1
2
quantization
step because of the resolution of the device. High resolution devices have less quantization
error.
3.6.3 Central Limit Theorem
Let X1, X2, ..., Xn be independent, identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables having
mean µ and a non-zero variance σ2. If Sn = X1 +X2 + ...+Xn , Then
lim
n→∞
P
(
Sn − nµ
σ
√
n
≤ x
)
= φ(x) (3.9)
where φ(x) is the probability that standard normal random variable is less than x.
3.6.4 Extension Field
GF (pn) , n > 1 is called an extension field of GP (p). If p = 2, we called it a binary
extension field. In symbol it is represented as Fpn .
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3.6.5 WG Transformation
Let
t(x) = x+ xr1 + xr2 + xr3 + xr4 , x ∈ F2n (3.10)
where r′is are defined by
r1 = 2
k + 1 r1 = 2
k−1 + 1
r2 = 2
2k−1 + 2k−1 + 1 r2 = 22k−2 + 2k−1 + 1
r3 = 2
2k−12k−1 + 1 r3 = 22k−22k−1 + 1
r4 = 2
2k−1 + 2k1 r4 = 22k−1 + 2k−1 + 1
for n = 3k − 1 for n = 3k − 2
Then a function
f(x) = Tr(g(x+ 1) + 1), x ∈ F2n (3.11)
where f(x) is a function from F2n → F2 and is called the WG Transformation of Tr(g(x)).
The WG transformation only exits if n (mod 3) 6= 0 [20].
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Chapter 4
Software Defined Radio, GNU Radio
and USRP
In this chapter we will give an overview of Software Defined Radio and its applications,
GNU Radio (an open source software toolkit used for signal processing on a host computer)
and USRP (a hardware device use as a transceiver for radio signals and feeds the DSP or
host embedded PC with sampled signals for processing).
4.1 Introduction
Radio is a science of communicating over a distance by converting sounds or signals to
electromagnetic waves and radiating these through space in a radio frequency band in a
range of about 10kHZ to 300GHz [21]
With the evolution of communications technology, its rapid change from analog to
digital has made it possible to implement most of the radio functions in software in modern
radio systems leading to software defined radio. The term software defined radio (SDR)
or software radio (SR) was first coined by Joseph Mitola in 1991. According to the latest
definition recently coordinated between the IEEE and the SDR Forum:
A software defined radio is radio in which some or all of the Physical Layer
Functions are software-defined
An extensive definition is given by Joseph Mitola:
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Figure 4.1: An ideal Software Defined Radio
A software radio is a radio whose channel modulation waveforms are de-
fined in software. That is, waveforms are generated as sampled digital signals,
converted from digital to analog via a wideband DAC and then possibly up-
converted from IF to RF. The receiver, similarly, employs a wideband Analog
to Digital Converter (ADC) that captures all of the channels of the software
radio node. The receiver then extracts, downconverts and demodulates the
channel waveform using software on a general purpose processor. Software
radios employ a combination of techniques that include multi-band antennas
and RF conversion; wideband ADC and Digital to Analog conversion (DAC);
and the implementation of IF, baseband and bitstream processing functions in
general purpose programmable processors. The resulting software-defined radio
(or software radio) in part extends the evolution of programmable hardware,
increasing flexibility via increased programmability [39].
The convergence of SDR is made conceivable due to advancement in software and digital
signal processor (DSP) that allows digital processing of radio frequency signals. A software
radio uses digital signal processing and software communications radio system functions
(mixers, filters, amplifiers, modulators/demodulators, detectors, channel model etc) on a
targeted processor and memory to host it for real time communications.
4.1.1 An Ideal Software Radio
An ideal software Radio consists of an Antenna, Analog to Digital converter (ADC)/ Digital
to Analog Converter (DAC) and embedded processor to handle all digital processing for
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the received/transmitted signals. An ideal SR is shown in Figure 4.1.
In the receiver chain, an antenna receives the signals and passes it on to the ADC.
Digital samples are then passed through the DSP or embedded PC for further processing.
Similarly, in the transmitter chain, digital samples are taken from DSP or embedded PC
and passed on to the DAC which feeds analog signals to the antenna for transmission. In
a transceiver path, the processing block and an antenna may be shared between receiver
and transmitter.
4.1.2 Practical Software Defined Radio
SDR presented in the previous section is simple and extremely flexible but it is not practical.
The practical software defined radio includes many non-DSP hardware components like
anti-aliasing filters, power handling, frequency up/down converters, etc. as the current
ADC/DAC and DSPs does not support direct sampling of wideband RF signals.
As technology is ever evolving, the digital signal processors (DSP) are becoming faster,
the conversion rates and the dynamic range are increasing, ADC/DAC are getting closer to
the antenna. Due to this reason software defined radio is replacing the analogue circuitry
in conventional radio systems by taking up additional processing tasks in the software part.
4.2 Need for SDR
In the past, the radio was used for military purposes and each one could only perform
the particular task it has been designed and optimized for. If ever a need was evolved
to use the radio for a different task, the complete hardware had to be re-designed. This
was of course a costly and less flexible solution which led to compatibility issues as well.
This problem was addressed by Velcro radios [23] who presented a solution for reducing
the hardware that had to be carried around. The solution was developed on the basis of
common architecture involved in all radios. They proposed to use a common motherboard
and attached different peripherals (silicon chips) to it. For example if an army commander
wants to talk to another on a particular frequency, he would use a specific peripheral and
connect with his motherboard. He can replace the chip if he wants to use another frequency
and protocol related to it. This reduced the total hardware involved in the conventional
military radio systems but there was limited cross-functionality when a specific chip would
only be compatible to the motherboard provided by the same manufacturer. An open
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modular hardware architecture was developed to address this problem but communicating
with simultaneously different radios were still not feasible [42].
As technology advanced rapidly, flexible software implementation of analog circuits in
digital processing took over more tasks that were initially accomplished in less flexible
programmable and special purpose hardware devices. The flexibility of software imple-
mentation of digital components of radio allows adaptive transitions to waveforms and RF
frequencies not possible in previous technologies. SDR allows easy and simple enhancement
to the existing system without replacing or modifying the hardware.
4.3 Evolution of SDR
Software Defined Radio has been originated by defense sector of US and Europe in late
1970s [23, 40]. By the end of the 1980s, emerging standards and incompatible protocols had
made the radio technology evaluation process stagnant [42]. There were compatibility and
cross-functional limitation problems in communicating on different RF frequency bands
using different encoding methods and waveforms. Conventional radios were not keeping
up to the rapid change in technology adoption. Similarly, the commercial use of radio
systems were passing through the same dilemma. Each manufacturer wanted to provide
new features on minimized cost layout by keeping the legacy system architecture. This
limited the radio systems to specific geographic locations around the world. The proponents
of radio technology were looking for a MultiBand MultiMode Radio (MBMMR) systems
[32, 38].
Initially, MBMMR was implemented by encapsulating different RF bands and modes in
a single package that could change their configuration by changing the parameters and were
known as Velcro radios. By packing all these peripherals in the same system tremendously
increased its size.1.
To reduce the size of Velcro radios, Programmable Digital Radios (PDRs) were in-
troduced in which programmable ROMs and ASIC processors replaced small hardware
components. A prominent increase in efficiency, flexibility and reduction in size, weight
and cost intrigued the manufacturers and researcher to shift more hardware functionality
to software processing which gave birth to software defined radios. With the increase in
conversion rate and dynamic range of AD/DA converters, the RF components got closer
to the software processing independent of analog hardware, which provided more flexibility
in generating different waveforms without modifying the hardware.
1Moree’s law does not apply to RF components [42]
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4.4 SPEAKeasy
SPEAKeasy was the first publicly announced military software radio initiated by US De-
partment of Defense. The rationale behind SPEAKeasy program was to develop a modular,
reprogrammable, reconfigurable, modem with open architecture. SPEAKeasy program was
into two phases. The Phase I was aimed to demonstrate a proof-of-concept for the feasi-
bility of software radios and its ability to inter-operate with more than 15 existing radios
using MBMMR’s envision.
4.4.1 SPEAKeasy Phase I
The Phase I was researched from 1992 to 1995, which was conducted by Hazeltine as the
major contractor, and TRW as software subcontractor [32]. The Phase I was designed and
implemented to provide the basic architecture for software radio and have the following
capabilities:
• Interoperability between military radios
• Adaption of emerging new technology
• More flexibility without compromising the performance and power consumption
• Aim to cover single wide-band range from 2 MHz to 2 GHz
• Incorporating information security as well as transmission security using programmable
INFOSEC processor, Cryptographic Reduced instruction Set (CYPRIS) and software
implementation of the cryptographic algorithms in the multichannel SPEAKeasy IN-
FOSEC Module (SIM)
The first practical demonstration of SPEAKeasy Phase I carried out successfully in June
1995. The interoperability was presented by connecting multiple existing radios applying
different protocols. New protocols were programmed into software and were exhibited by
two units of SPEAKeasy. The technology available then did not permit to have a single
wide band RF channel of range 2MHz-2GHz, so they divided the range into 3 sub-bands.
The first was High Frequency (HF) ranging from 2-30MHz. The second was Very High
Frequency (VHF) ranging from 30-400MHz. The last is Ultra High Frequency (UHF)
ranging from 400MHz-2GHz. Only VHF band was implemented in Phase I for feasibility
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demonstration. It was observed that software radios are feasible for interoperability func-
tions of radios and are compatible with new features of evolving technology. The general
architecture of SPEAKeasy was same as conventional radios but all the blocks were digital
except for the front end antennas. The common hardware was reprogrammable, multi-
chip module (MCM) was employed for basic signal processing and CYPRIS was used for
INFOSEC and TRANSEC for transmission security.
4.4.2 SPEAKeasy Phase II
The Phase II of SPEAKeasy was a 4 year project initiated in 1995. Motorola was the
prime contractor and designed a white band RF transceiver. Its main features included
open architecture for the entire radio and a more formalized software structure as compared
to Phase I. Security was incorporate in its software structure in the single architecture as
two modules, BLACK (secure) and RED (unsecure). The primary objectives of Phase II
are as follows:
• Implementing a reconfigurable architecture
• Open and modular architecture for the entire radio system
• Cross Channel Connectivity
• Emphasis on more commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and incorporating standards
• CYPRIS was improved to handle many different algorithms of INFOSEC and TRANSEC
simultaneous
• Reduce radio size to improve practicality in the field
Though it was a 4 year project but it was ready for demonstration within 15 months.
The exhibit was successful and manufacturing was started immediately. The Land Mobile
Radio (LMR) waveform was developed in less than two weeks to add to SPEAKeasy
units. One of the units was repaired in the field using COTS [14]. Since this was the
first demonstration of Phase II so only 4-400MHz was exhibited in it but it achieved all
its primary objectives. The project was closed and no further research was carried out for
SPEAKeasy.
The hardware and software of SPEAKeasy Phase I and Phase II was used by joint
tactical radio system programs (JTRS) and SDR forum for defining their standards.
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4.5 GNU Radio
The GNU Radio is software development toolkit provided with signal processing library
for developing and experimenting with SDR concepts. GNU Radio works under GNU
General Public License (GPL)2. The project was initiated in 2000 by Eric Blossom and
now supported by large community of volunteers working for the development of SDR.
GNU Radio is mainly supported for Linux operating system with partial support for Mac
and Windows.
4.5.1 GNU Radio Architecture
Processing Blocks: Signal processing blocks take continuous data stream(s) at their
input and generate data stream(s) at their output. Apart from signal processing blocks,
GNU Radio also provides signal sources and sinks which only produce or consume data
stream(s) respectively. GNU Radio processing library provide more than 100 signal blocks.
User can also write his own processing block if needed3. GNU radio framework take care
of each block’s number of input samples it might requires to produce the required output
samples by using forecost() method.
Data Buffers: Blocks can have different input streams rate in flow graph but all output
streams must be generated at the same rate.Blocks have input and output buffer associated
with them to keep synchronization among different stream rates.
Flow Graph: GNU Radio applications are written using flow graph. The vertices in flow
graph represent the processing blocks and edges constitute the data flow between them.
The signal processing blocks are written in C++ language and are connected using Python.
Each block primarily written for performing only one task to enable open and modular
software architecture. Processing block takes infinite stream(s) of data flow from the input
and after processing provides the output stream(s). GNU Radio uses Simplified Wrapper
and Interface Generator (SWIG) to interface signal processing block written in C++ to be
accessible from Python.
Data Type: The data types of signal processing blocks’ stream can be of any kind. But
the most common data types used in GNU Radio are
• c - complex(float)
2The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for software [59].
3Further information about how to write a signal processing block can be found at [46, 47]
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• f - single precision float
• s - short integer (2-byte)
• i - integer (4-byte)
These data types also exist as vector type. The data flows from one block to another in
the form of bits or samples.
4.5.2 GNU Radio Companion (GRC)
GRC is graphical tool for creating signal flow graphs by connecting different processing
blocks written in GNU Radio and generates a Python script to create and control signal flow
graphs using visual programming language for signal processing via GNU Radio libraries.
It provides easy and editable drag and drop flow graph environment to work without
worrying about the underlying processes. GRC was developed by Josh Blum [3].
4.6 Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP)
USRP provides hardware interface for GNU Radio to build software defined radio using
UHD. UHD is a hardware host driver and API for Ettus Research products i.e. all USRP
devices, compatible with Linux, Windows and Mac. Users are able to use UHD driver
standalone or with third party applications such as GNU Radio, Simulink, OpenBTS,
Iris and LabVIEW [57]. A typical USRP consists of one motherboard which supports
several plug-on daughterboards of different RF bands. USRP with GNU radio provides
a complete SDR platform. USRP connects to a host PC via USB2.0 (USRP1) [55] or
Ethernet (USRPN210) [56].
4.6.1 Features of USRP-1
USRP-1 includes the following features.
• Four 64 MS/s 12-bit analog to digital Converters and four 128 MS/s 14-bit digital
to analog Converters
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• Four digital downconverters and two digital upconverters with programmable deci-
mation rates and interpolation rates respectively
• High-speed USB 2.0 interface (480 Mb/s) and capable of processing signals up to 16
MHz wide
• Modular architecture supports wide variety of RF daughterboards
• Auxiliary analog and digital I/O support complex radio controls such as RSSI and
AGC
• Fully coherent multi-channel systems (MIMO capability)
4.7 Wrap-up
GNU Radio with the USRP provide an inexpensive, flexible and powerful supporting tool
in license free radio bands for learning and experimenting with software defined radio
concepts. Most of the applications can be developed using GRC without even writing any
code. With increasing number of available signal blocks, GNU radio is becoming more and
more flexible.
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Chapter 5
Literature Review
In this chapter, we will review the various physical layer approaches proposed in literature
to secure the communications of RFID system.
5.1 Security and Privacy
RFID system security mainly depends on the privacy and authentication of Rˇ and Tˇ [28].
Conventionally, privacy and security is considered essentially as a part of the upper layers
except physical layer. With advances in technology, most of the cryptographic protocols are
implemented at application layer with an assumption that physical layer is already present
for reliable transmission of the encoded information from sender to receiver. Even if Eve
gets the encoded data, he could not decode the bits without some additional knowledge.
Unfortunately, this principle holds for many of communication devices but not for all of
them. Ultra-low power environment technologies like wireless sensor nodes and RFID are
designed for low cost and long life applications. Due to real time data processing with
power, time and computational constraints, these technologies are subjected to security
and privacy problems [34, 41]. Recently, extensive research has been carried out on the
physical characteristics of communication channel to secure ultra-low power technologies
from various security and privacy threats.
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5.2 Exploitation of Channel Characteristics
In the literature many physical layer techniques have been proposed. Most of them use
noise generator as an additional hardware to produce noise from the reader [44] or from
the RFID tag’s side [7]. In this way the eavesdropper, who is unaware of the added noise
to the signal cannot filter it out to retrieve the messages that are being exchanged between
the reader and tag.
Adding noise to the wireless communication channel is not a novel technique, it has
been around for many years derived from the Shannon’s work [45]. Later in 1975, Wyner
introduced the wiretap channel [49]. In his model, sender and receiver can securely com-
municate through a particular encoding and decoding pair in the presence of wiretapper
without pre-shared key [27]. The goal of such communication channel is to send the mes-
sage from source to legitimate receiver, while keeping an eavesdropper unaware of the
messages that are being exchanged. The key element of wiretap channel is that the legiti-
mate receiver and wiretapper have different channels from the source. The main channel
is noiseless and only contains the communication channel noise, i.e., N′ whereas Wiretap
channel has significant noise, i.e., N′′ as shown in Figure 5.1.
Source Encoder 
Main 
Channel 
Wiretap 
Channel 
Decoder 
Legitimate 
Receiver 
Decoder Wiretapper 
S ϵ {0,1}m v ϵ {0,1}n 
y1  = v + N’ 
y2  = v + N” 
u ϵ {0,1}m 
u' ϵ {0,1}m 
s 
s' 
Figure 5.1: Wiretap Channel
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The channel characteristics of main and wiretap channels can be expressed as
y1 = v + N
′
y2 = v + N
′′
respectively where the power of P(N′) << P(N′′).
The main idea in wiretap channel is to minimize the information gained by wiretapper
and to maximize the information gained by the legitimate receiver. Based on information
theory regarding noise and channel capacity, the legitimate receiver will recover the signal
from added channel noise while wiretapper cannot.
Many ideas have been presented in theory based on Wyner’s wiretap channel. The proof
that wiretapper doesn’t get any information from the shared channel is based on a strong
assumption that wiretap channel is much noisier than main channel. This assumption is
hard to fulfill in all cases which makes it less attractive to secure wireless communications
in reality.
5.2.1 Blocker Tag
Juels et al. in [29] has proposed a conceptual scheme to protect consumer privacy problem
that they called blocking. According to this scheme, a consumer has an additional tag
that they call a blocker tag. Since the passive RFID tag has broadcast embedded in its
nature, it will respond to a reader present in its vicinity without the knowledge of tag
holder. This scheme has been proposed to prevent this type of unnecessary messaging and
scanning. They have exploit the properties of an anti-collision protocol singulation which
is already present in the RFID system. Singulation allows the reader to read many tags
simultaneously at a time by first collectively communicating with all present in the vicinity
of the system and then communicating with them individually later on.
Tree Walking is a type of Singulation protocol used for RFID tags. It is based on the
binary tree structure with k depth. The root node is null. The node pointer progresses
to its left child if a 0 bit is encountered for the identifier. Conversely, it progresses to the
right child if the next bit in the identifier is 1. During simultaneous communication with
multiple tags, the pointer can move to both child nodes if a 0 and 1 are encountered at
the same time. If m bits of identifier value are sent by the tag, the pointer will traverse to
the depth of m bits to identify the tag.
The first bit of the identifier is known as the protected bit with the help of which the
blocker tag performs selective blocking. For example if it is 0, the tag will act normal and
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the tree pointer will move to the right half of the root node. Whereas if the first bit is
1, the pointer moves to the right half which is declared as the privacy zone of the tree.
Once the tree pointer has entered the privacy zone, the blocker tag will start transmitting
random bits in pair irrespective of all other tag. The reader will not be able to identify
any of the other tags present in its vicinity hence blocking the scanning.
5.2.2 Noisy Tag Protocol
A method for key exchange was proposed by Castelluccia and Avoine in [7] which is a
similar idea as the blocker tag discussed previously. However, in this case a noisy tag
is owned by the RFID system. The reader and noisy tag have the same pseudorandom
generator with pre-shared key. This protocol is carried out in two phases, the Exchange
Phase and the Reconciliation Phase.
Exchange Phase:
1. The reader sends nonce N to the noisy tag.
2. The noisy tag will generate its own pseudo random sequence using f(k,N) where k
is the pre-shared key between noisy tag and the reader and f is the pseudorandom
generator function.
3. When the reader initiates the query, the legitimate as well as noisy tag will respond
by transmitting the numbers generated by their pseudo random generators bit by
bit. Since the channel is Additive White Gaussian Noise AWGN, bits generated by
both tags will be added to one another.
4. If both tag transmit the same bit simultaneously, i.e., 00 or 11, the reader and
eavesdropper will receive the same symbol, i.e., S00 or S11. If both tags transmit a
different bit i.e. S01 or S10, the eavesdropper would not be able to distinguish which
bit was sent by the noisy tag. This is referred to bit blocking.
5. Since the reader knows the pseudorandom sequence generated by the noisy tag, it
will subtract the sequence from the received signal to retrieve the sequence sent by
legitimate tag.
Reconciliation Phase:
1. The reader will discard the symbol sequence of the form S00 or S11 and will send the
time instances of other symbols to the legitimate tag.
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On average the reader needs 2n rounds to exchange the key since there is probability
that n round are affected by collision if both tags transmit the same bit. This is known as
the same bit problem. Another code based protocol presented in the same paper reduces
the number of rounds to n by transmitting multiple bits from both tags to lessen the
chances of collision. Based on this idea, Hancke in [26] and [25] proposed a new scheme
called Noisy Carrier Modulation for key exchange.
5.2.3 Noisy Reader
Savry in [44] proposed a scheme after exploiting that the passive tag can send a reply
to the reader on noisy carrier. This scheme involves a separate noise generating device
synchronized with the reader. The reader sends an EPC C1 Gen2 command to the tag
and triggers the noise generator to send a noisy signal into the channel. The tag replies
on the same noisy signal which looks random to the passive eavesdropper. The legitimate
reader already knows about the noise generated by the noise generator so it can cancel the
effect of noisy signal from the tag’s reply. This is called Cooperative Jamming.
5.2.4 RFID Guardian
Rieback et al. in [43] proposed a conceptual mobile battery powered device for privacy
management of RFID systems which they named as RFID Guardian. It logs the RFID
tags and readers and provides secure communication between the unknown reader and the
customer’s tag. RFID Guardian is owned by the customer and provides access control
mechanism which enables the tag to communicate with legitimate readers and restrict the
rogue readers.
5.2.5 BUPLE
Chai and Gong in [8] proposed a novel physical layer scheme for securing the low cost tag
to reader communication in the presence of passive eavesdropper which they named as
BUPLE (Backscatter modulation- and Un-coordinated frequency hopping-assisted Physical
Layer Enhancement). In this scheme to hide the transmission from the eavesdropper,
they used carrier wave amplitude along with periodically hopping frequency to transmit
a message. They also used random sequence modulated to carrier’s phase to prevent
bit modifications. Their scheme provide security against passive eavesdropping and relay
attacks.
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5.3 Authentication and Distance Checking
The term Authentication means that at least one of the parties involved in communication
is aware of the identity of the other. If all parties are assured about the identities of each
other, then this is known as Mutual Authentication.
Distance Checking means that a party ensures the other parties involved in the com-
munication that it is located at a specified distance to them.
All the cryptographic authentication protocols do not guarantee distance checking with
authentication. Many such protocols were subjected to relay attacks [17, 19, 24, 18, 16].
There are two types of relay attacks. Mafia Fraud Attack and Terrorist Fraud Attack.
Mafia Fraud Attack is similar to Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack in which adversary
tries to relay the communication between two legitimate parties. Desmedt et al. first
demonstrated the Mafia Fraud Attack in [15]. He presented that even if cryptographically
strong authentication protocols are not designed carefully, they can fall prey to mafia fraud
attack based on grandmaster chess problem [13]. In the Terrorist Fraud Attack the prover
is legitimate but dishonest, who with the help of an adversary tries to convince the verifier
that he is within the range [2, 30].
There is another type of attack in which the deceitful tag tries to convince the verifier
that it is close to it. It is called Distance Fraud Attack [30].
5.3.1 Distance Bounding Protocol
The countermeasures of aforementioned attacks were proposed by Distance Bounding Pro-
tocol [2]. The basic idea of this is based on cryptographic challenge response protocol with
strict time constraints on the response time.
Brands and Chaum in [4] designed the first Distance Bounding Protocol. The protocol
had three phases which work as follows:
Step 1: The verifier and prover generate a random binary sequence V = v1, v2, ..., vn
and P = p1, p2, ..., pn respectively.
Step 2: The verifier sends one challenge bit vi and starts the timer. Immediately, the
prover upon receiving this bit replies with pi which stops the timer at the verifier. The
verifier calculates the distance based on the timer value which is the Round Trip Time
(RTT) for each bit. This step is repeated k times.
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Step 3: After n bits have been exchanged, the prover sends the authentication code/digital
signature for the two binary sequences V and P .
Steps 1 and 3 are slow phases, whereas Step 2 is a fast phase of this protocol which is
repeated k times.
5.3.2 Hancke and Kuhn’s Protocol
Hancke and Kuhn presented the first RFID protocol for distance bounding as shown in
Figure 5.2. Their scheme was based on Brands and Chaum’s protocol. They proposed in
their own protocol that the last step can be omitted when used for RFID systems. Hence
it has only two phases described as follows:
  
Verifier Prover 
Nv Nv 
               
Nv )    
                              
v ϵ vi 
vi ϵ 
{R0} 
{R1} 
{R0} = 0 
{R1} = 1 
Non-Time Critical Phase 
  Time Critical Phase                   
                                                  
Figure 5.2: Hancke and Kuhn’s Protocol
Non-Time Critical:
1. The verifier sends a random number Nv to the prover which is regenerated for each
session.
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2. The verifier and prover calculate two n-bit binary sequences R0 and R1 using the
random number Nv, the secret key K and the cryptographic function h
R01R
0
2...R
0
n||R11R12...R1n := h(K,Nv)
Time Critical
1. The verifier generates a random binary sequence V = v1, v2, ..., vn, then sends one
challenge bit vi to the prover and starts the timer.
2. The prover upon receiving this bit replies with Rvii which stops the timer at the
verifier. This step is repeated n times.
3. The verifier checks the reply with his computed Rvii . If the reply matches and is
received in sufficiently short period of time, then the verifier accepts the prover as
the valid tag.
As there are only two states i.e. 0 or 1 in their protocol in time critical phase, an
adversary could randomly choose the v′i = vi with 0.5 probability of success and store the
prover’s response. After n rounds he could respond to the verifier with the prover’s reply.
In this case, adversary has (3
4
)n probability of success.
Later Kim and Avoine in [30] presented an enhanced version of Hancke and Kuhn’s
protocol in which they used multi-state with binary mixed challenges.
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Chapter 6
Direct Sequence Backscatter
Encryption for Low Cost RFID
Systems
In this chapter, we present a new physical layer encryption scheme that we call Direct
Sequence Backscatter Encryption (DSB-Enc), together with the simulation and experi-
mental implementation for validating the scheme. Section 6.1 presents our system model
for a proposed physical layer scheme. In Section 6.2, we discuss the FSM implemented
on our tag. Section 6.3 introduces the principle of level generator and the scheme. In
Section 6.4, we give the simulation model using GNU Radio and preliminary results of our
new physical layer scheme for low cost RFID systems. In Section 6.5, we discuss in detail
our experimental setup and its environment. Finally in Section 6.6, we validate our pro-
posed scheme by implementing it on software defined radio and a WISP tag and conclude
the chapter by providing the results.
6.1 System Model
We assumed two or more Pseudo Random Sequence (Number) Generators (PRSG) to
produce bit streams ai, bi, ci and so on. This is shown in Figure 6.1. Each bit ai, bi, ci
and so on is assumed to be independent, identical and uniformly distributed. The time
samples of binary bits from a PRSG is shown in Figure 6.2.
Further, we also assumed that there is only one legitimate reader Rˇ and one legitimate
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PRSG-1 
PRSG-2 
PRSG-3 
PRSG-n 
ai  ϵ{-1, 1} 
bi  ϵ{-1, 1} 
ci  ϵ{-1, 1} 
{…,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,…} 
Figure 6.1: Combinatorial generator with n PRSGs
Figure 6.2: Time samples of Binary bits of a PRSG
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tag Tˇ in our system. Rˇ and Tˇ do trust each other and are not compromised. Signal collision
and interference from simultaneous response produced by multiple tags are not considered
in our system. Since our physical layer scheme is independent of upper layer protocols, we
intentionally keep the functionally of the reader and the tag as simple as possible. We do
not care much about the reader and a tag interaction at the logic layer.
In our system we only care about the physical layer and we intentionally keep the upper
layers for Rˇ and Tˇ as simple as possible.
6.2 Finite State Machine for Tag
Tag in our system acts as a Finite State Machine (FSM) to transmit data by using backscat-
ter communication. Different states of tag are shown in Figure 6.3.
S0 
S1 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S6 
Powered off 
Harvest power Powered up 
Transmit ID  
Waiting 
t < 270ms 
t > 270ms 
Sleep mode 
Harvest power 
Transmit user data 
Figure 6.3: Finite State Machine (FSM) for tag
Initially, Tag is in powered off state S0. Reader sends the multilevel continuous carrier
wave to tag. Tag harvests the ephemeral energy for computation from the carrier wave in
state S1. Once the tag is fully charged (S2) it transmits 16-bit ID number by changing the
impedance of an antenna in state S3. After sending the tag’s ID it goes in waiting state
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S4 in sleep mode. If it receives power while in state S4 it moves to state S5 and gets fully
charged and transmits data in state S6 else it goes back to state S0. Finally, after sending
data it comes back to its initial state.
6.2.1 Discharging of Passive Tag
We can exactly calculate the waiting time for state S4 for a passive tag. All passive tags
harvest energy from the reader carrier wave and store it in a capacitor. We can model
a capacitor in an RC circuit and calculate its discharging time after which the tag will
discharge and goes back to its initial state.
 
Figure 6.4: Charging and Discharging Phase of Passive Tag’s Capacitor
According to circuit theory the charging of a capacitor can be written as
V (t) = V◦(1− e −tτ ) (6.1)
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and discharging of a capacitor as follows
V (t) = V◦(e
−t
τ ) (6.2)
where e = 2.71828, V◦ is the initial voltage stored on a capacitor, t is the discharging
time and τ is the time constant which is determined through RC parameters of a circuit.
Charging/discharging phases are shown in Figure 6.4.
The Eq. (6.1) and (6.2) show that in charging and discharging phase the voltage across
resistor grows and decays exponentially. When t = τ , V(t) falls to e−1 = 0.368 of its initial
voltage.
We can calculate the discharging time for the passive tag’s capacitor from Eq. (6.2)
as follow. The resistor and capacitor used in Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform
(WISP) 4.1 DL tag is 2.4kΩ and 100µF respectively [61]. The maximum voltage across a
capacitor can be 5.5V and the minimum voltage required by the tag to retain its current
state is 1.8V, we have t= 1.117τ where τ = 0.240. Therefore, discharging time (t) for a
capacitor is 0.240τ ≈ 270ms [35].
Remark: If the reader does not send carrier signal to the passive tag for >270ms, the
tag will go to its initial state otherwise it moves to the next state.
6.3 Direct Sequence Backscatter Encryption
The key component of DSB Enc scheme is a level generator. To understand the principle
of level generator, we have to review the RFID communications standards. In ISO 14443
HF RFID and EPC UHF C1 Gen2 the reader encodes data using different line codes as
mentioned in Section 2.1.4.
Our scheme works in the following way, the reader has been modified for signal gen-
eration by using multiple LFSRs which produce different signal levels and each level is
encoded using NRZ-L. The encoded signal levels are discrete and are made continuous by
adding them to a continuous wave. This will ensure that the tag never runs out of power
supply. The resultant wave is modulated on a carrier frequency 902-928 MHz using MPSK
as shown in Figure 6.5.
Level generator is implemented by multiple LFSRs, detail in Section 6.4 of this chapter,
or other methods, which will be discussed in Section 7.3 in next chapter. Each sub-
generator in level generator generators i.i.d random sequences with Gaussian distribution.
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Generator 
NRZ-L 
Encoder 
Continuous 
Wave 
si bi 
MPSK 
Carrier wave 
(cos 2∏fct) 
fc ϵ [902, 928 MHz] 
bi(t) 
Figure 6.5: Principle of level generator
According to the central limit theorem (CLT) in Section 3.6.3, the sum of these sub-
sequences, which is the output of level generator, is Gaussian. Therefore the transmitted
signal becomes Gaussian.
To transmit the message to the reader, the passive tag modulates a resistive or capac-
itive load at its antenna and adds its response to the carrier signal using BASK or OOK.
The resultant is still Gaussian. So if Eve picks the tag’s reply, Eve will get a Gaussian
signal which is hard to decode without a priori knowledge of the levels generated by the
reader. Therefore only the legitimate reader can decode the tag’s reply by subtracting
the levels at the reader side. Another obstacle for an eavesdropper is the synchronization
problem of levels generated at the time of transmission which we will discuss in detail in
the next chapter.
Remarks: The goals of the DSB Enc is to provide secure physical layer link for tag
to reader communications in the presence of a passive eavesdropper and defeat various
attacks that exists in RFID systems, e.g., relay attack and replay attacks. This scheme
works without requiring any pre-shared credentials by legitimate parties. DSB-Enc exploits
physical layer resources of passive RFID systems and provides security functions while
keeping the hardware cost of the reader and the tag almost unaffected, as required in
many RFID applications.
6.4 Simulation Using GNU Radio
In this section, we will presented our simulation model and explain it in detail. We have
implemented DSB Enc in GNU Radio using GRC signal flow graph. The block diagram
of a simulation model is shown in Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.6: Block diagram of simulation model
6.4.1 Design of Level Generator
To produce different levels of amplitudes, we tested our system model with different signal
sources. The levels were generated using a Gaussian random signal source. Theoretically,
it gives better security in our system but it is over killing for the hardware. We have used
LFSR with primitive polynomials to produce different levels. LFSRs are hardware as well
as software efficient. The random bits of LFSR are mapped on BPSK and then added
together to generate multiple levels. The resultant discrete levels are made continuous
using continuous constant wave. This continuous wave gives power supply to the passive
tag. To validate our concept of level generator we have built a simulation model using
GNU Radio by creating a flow graph.
PRSGs for levels generator are realized using the LFSRs primitive polynomial of degrees
29 and 31 over F2. The characteristic polynomials of degrees 29 and 31 are given in Eqs.
(6.3) and (6.4).
LFSR1 = x
29 + x2 + 1 (6.3)
LFSR2 = x
31 + x3 + 1. (6.4)
The primitive polynomials produce maximum length sequences also known as m-sequences
[20]. The period of LFSR1 and LFSR2 are 2
29 − 1 and 231 − 1 respectively. As these two
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primitive polynomials are co-prime and added together, therefore they generate sequence
of linear span LS = 601. Their respective linear recursive relations of Eqs (6.3) and (6.4)
are given by
ak+29 = ak+2 + ak (6.5)
ak+31 = ak+3 + ak, k = 0, 1, .... (6.6)
Table 6.1: Levels generated using two LFSRs
LFSR1 LFSR2 Levels
-1 -1 -2
-1 1 0
1 -1 0
1 1 2
The output bits {0, 1} of an LFSR are mapped onto {-1,1}. In the simulation, shown
in Section 6.4.1, we used bit rate of 500 kbps for producing LFSR bits in our simulation
model and the symbol rate of 32k symbols/sec. Combinatorial generator structure is used
to generate different levels. The generated levels from LFSR1 and LFSR2 are shown in
Table 6.1
Figure 6.7: Time samples of generated three levels
6.4.2 Continuous Wave
The levels generated using PRSG (LFSR) are symmetric around x-axis which does not
supply power to the passive tag due its periodic behavior. From Table 6.1, we can intu-
1The m-sequences with period 2n − 1 has linear span n
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Figure 6.8: Time samples of generated four levels
Figure 6.9: Time samples of generated five levels
Figure 6.10: Time samples of generated multi-levels
itively say that the average energy of the level sequence is zero. Therefore, we need another
method to power up the tag without compromising the properties of our level generator.
Periodic signals are the first choice to solve this problem. An essential class of continu-
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ous time periodic signal are the sinusoids, which can be expressed in the following general
form:
x(t) = A sin(ωt+ θ) (6.7)
where A is an amplitude, ω is an angular frequency and θ is the phase of the signal.
The Average power of a continuous time periodic signal x(t) with period T is given by
P =
1
T
∫ T
0
|x(t)|2 dt. (6.8)
According to Eq (6.8) the average power of a sinusoidal signal given in Eq (6.7) is
P =
A2
2
. (6.9)
By superimposing the generated level with sinusoidal carrier wave, we give sufficient
power supply to the passive tag for transmitting random bits and data. The sample rate
used for generating sinusoids baseband carrier signal was 100 kHz. To ensure the maximum
uncertainty for our system, we have used higher sample rate for baseband carrier than level
generated bits.
6.4.3 Throttle
Since we are generating levels, carrier signal and AWGN noise source, all on a same machine
there is no threshold for sample rate, therefore we used a throttle block to slow down the
sample rate to 100 kHz. This block is essential to keep the simulation model running
smoothly and from overwhelming the PC.
6.4.4 Modulation/Demodulation
We modulated our base band signal using a carrier frequency of 2.712 MHz which is a scaled
version of HF RFID standard frequency, i.e., 13.56 MHz by a factor 0.2. As modulation
frequency does not affect the performance or analysis of our system and due to high data
rate produced or processed by the PC, we reduced the modulation carrier frequency in our
simulation model.
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6.4.5 AWGN Channel
We modelled the channel between the reader and tag as AWGN (Additive White Gaussian
Noise) channel. AWGN is considered as the best model for analyzing the performance of
communication systems. According to central limit theorem the summation of many inde-
pendent identically distributed random process tend to be close to the normal distribution
which is best suited for most of the communication channels due to several noise sources2.
6.4.6 Quantizer
We made a quantizer block to quantize received signal in the signal flow graph for simulating
the real model. The levels generated at the transmission side were discrete. Therefore to
cancel those levels from the received signal we quantized the analogue signal to convert
it into discrete samples after which the system removed levels that were generated by the
system. We quantized the signals using 4 bit to 9 bit quantizers.
6.4.7 Simulation Results and Analysis
(1) Levels and Data Signal in the Same Frequency Band
Figure 6.11 shows (a) the transmitted signal amplitude distribution and (b) FFT plot
of signal at the receiver end, when the levels and data carrier signal are in the same
frequency band. The received signal is quantized with 4-bit quantizer and after passing
through a level cancellation block we got the transmitted sinusoidal signal back. For our
simulations we did not send any data with the signal. Instead of sending 1 and 0, we sent
the sinusoidal signal. Received signal histogram3 and Fast Fourier Transform is shown in
Figure 6.11−(c),(d).
Result 1: From the simulation results shown in Figure 6.11 and 6.12, we have shown that
we could recover the signal sent by a tag in the presence of AWGN channel as long as we
know the levels of amplitudes added at the time of transmission. We can remove all the
levels precisely at the receiver side regardless of the amplitudes of those levels.
2For more detail about Central Limit Theorem, reader is directed to [22]
3Histogram is a graphical representation of a probability distribution of continuous variable data
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(a) Amplitude distribution of received Signal (b) FFT of received signal
(c) Amplitude distribution after decoding (d) FFT of decoded signal
Figure 6.11: (a) Amplitude distribution (b) FFT of the received signal in simulation model
(c) Amplitude distribution of decoded signal (d) FFT of the received data after decoding
(2) Levels and Data Signal in Different Frequency Bands
According to Line Of Sight (LOS) path loss model for reflected signal propagations, power
loss in the free space is inversely proportional to the square of the distance ( 1
d2
) and is
independent of the signal wavelength after some critical distance. To increase the distance
between reader and tag, the following general methods can be applied.
• We can increase the received signal power by increasing the power of transmitted
signal. This is applicable in most cases but involves the threshold for increasing
power, i.e., antenna gain and receiver sensitivity.
• To solve the aforementioned problem, MIMO antennas can be used. However, it is
an expensive method.
However, in Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP), we cannot increase the am-
plitude of baseband signal more than 1.0 without avoiding the RF clipping/rounding. To
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(a) Amplitude distribution of received Signal (b) FFT of received signal
(c) Amplitude distribution before level cancella-
tion
(d) FFT of decoded signal
Figure 6.12: Amplitude of added levels are higher than actual data
tackle this problem, we have added the generated levels in the different frequency bands
than the original signal. As RFID UHF C1G2 standards have large frequency spectrum
ranging from 860-960 MHz [53], we can use the unused spectrum for adding levels of am-
plitude. The results for simulated model are shown in Figure 6.13.
Result 2: From the simulation results, we have shown a method to increase the transmit-
ted signal’s power by adding the levels of amplitude and data signal in different frequency
bands. This method follows the concept of double sideband large carrier (DSB-LC ) ampli-
tude modulation. Please note that DSB-LC is different from the Direct Sequence Backscat-
ter (DSB) Encryption scheme. As added levels in different frequency band do not carry
any information, therefore it a trade off between spectral efficiency and long range.
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(a) Amplitude distribution of received Signal (b) FFT of received signal
(c) Amplitude distribution after decoding (d) FFT of decoded signal
Figure 6.13: (a) Amplitude distribution (b) FFT of the received signal in simulation model
(c) Amplitude distribution of decoded signal (d) FFT of the received data after decoding
6.5 Implementation Using SDR
To validate our concept of DSB Enc scheme, we developed a prototype system. A system
model consists of three parties, one legitimate reader Rˇ, one legitimate tag Tˇ, and one
passive eavesdropper ξ, as shown in Figure 6.14. We are intentionally not sending any
data from Rˇ → Tˇ to make this system as simple as possible.
6.5.1 Merits of Software Defined Radio
To allow flexibility, the Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) is deployed for pro-
grammable RFID reader working at Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) band. USRP equipped
with RFX900 (flex-900) daughterboard with effective frequency range between 750 - 1050
MHz [54] is used as transceiver which provides inexpensive RF transceiver with open source
schematics and drivers for our experimental testbed.
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Wireless Channel 
Reader Tag 
Figure 6.14: System model
6.5.2 RFID Reader
We used an USRP-1 embedded with two RFX900 daughterboards carrying two Left Hand
Circularly Polarized (LHCP) antennas effective in a range of 902 - 928 MHz [63]. We
developed a signal flow graph on GNU Radio Companion4 to enable this reader to send
multilevel amplitude signals and provide sufficient power supply to the passive tag at 915
MHz.
1. In the transmission path, discrete signal levels are generated by GNU Radio and sent
to USRP-1 via USB 2.0 [55]. USRP-1 interpolates the baseband signal to the interme-
diate frequency (IF) band and ultra high frequency(UHF) using digital upconverter
(DUC) and finally sent to digital to analogue converter (DAC) and transmitted into
the air via RFX900 and its antenna.
2. Similarly in the receiver path, an antenna captures the response signal from the tag
and downconvert IF from UHF and further downconvert it to the baseband signal
using digital downconverter (DDC) and sends it to GNU Radio running on our PC
for further processing. We logged the response of passive tag in a file for decoding
and analysis.5
4GRC is graphical tool for creating signal flow graphs by connecting different processing blocks writ-
ten in GNU Radio and generates a Python script to create and control signal flow graphs using visual
programming language for signal processing via GNU Radio libraries
5The decoding algorithm have been developed in MATLAB
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The Python scripts (signal flow graph) run on Lenovo ThinkCentre M92p with Ubuntu
12.04 and communicates with the USRP-1 using the USRP Hardware Driver(UHD) [57]
provided by Ettus6.
6.5.3 Passive RFID Tag
We made use of a passive tag due to its unique properties that are important for our proof-
of-concept. We used WISP v4.1 tag [61] to conduct our experiments. Unique features
of WISP tag not only include wireless power harvesting, ephemeral energy storage and
backscatter radiation but also allow re-programming [6, 48]. It comes with a firmware
that supports most of the EPC C1 Gen2 standard protocols but for our experiment we
did not use an EPC standard protocol. We re-programmed WISP in C language using
IAR embedded workbench v5.40.7 and implemented a Finite State Machine (FSM) to
transmit the data for tag to reader communications. WISP tag does not actively transmit
RF signal instead it backscatters the incident carrier wave from the reader by modulating
the impedance of the antenna. We initially sent 16-bit ID of the tag and demodulated it
using the DSB Enc scheme as describe previously in the chapter.
6.5.4 Experimental Environment
We conducted all our experiments in an office environment to test proof-of-concept in real
world settings. The multi-path effects and interference from nearby RF devices made it
worst case scenario in possible real world problem test settings.
6.6 Experimental Results
In this section we present the experimental results of our proposed scheme.
6.6.1 Reader to Tag communication
During testing, we used UHF band frequency (915 MHz) for reader to tag communication.
6UHD is a hardware host driver and API for Ettus Research products i.e. all USRP devices, compat-
ible with Linux, Windows and Mac. Users are able to use UHD driver standalone or with third party
applications such as GNU Radio, Simulink, OpenBTS, Iris and LabVIEW
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Figure 6.15: Complex time samples of levels generated and added constant continuous
wave
Figure 6.16: FFT plot of the transmitted signal by Reader
Figure 6.15 shows the output discrete signal levels of level generator in time domain.
The amplitude scaling factor of generated levels were kept 0.1 ampl. FFT plot of the
transmitted signal is shown in Figure 6.16.
Figure 6.17 shows the distribution of generated levels before transmission. Antenna
gain of transmitter was 45 dB because we wanted to send a strong signal for testing. The
generated signal is added to carrier whose amplitude was scaled to a factor of 0.8 ampl. The
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Figure 6.17: Amplitude distribution plot of received signal
overall signal amplitude was 0.9 ampl. It is scaled to this value to keep it lower than 1.0
in order to avoid clipping/rounding (we have tested this for different baseband amplitude
levels of both carrier wave and level generator)7. The distance between the reader and tag
was kept to be 1.5 meters.
6.6.2 Channel Response
The channel and tag’s response is shown in Figure 6.18. The Figure 6.17 shows amplitude
distribution of the received signals. The distribution follows Gaussian distribution. The
unique property of Gaussian distribution is that adding and subtractive values to it does
not affect the Gaussian distribution which hides the information about the bits that are
being sent by the tag to reader communications. The communications from tag to reader
were logged in a file for decoding and further processing.
7The amplitude parameter set above 1.0 in USRP is invalid and will cause clipping/rounding in the
digital domain
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6.6.3 Tag to Reader communication
The receiver’s antenna gain for experiments was kept 20 dB to receive clean response
from the tag. Figure 6.18 shows that the resultant received signal is a superposition of
the varying amplitude levels generated carrier wave and the tag response8. As legitimate
reader Rˇ has the knowledge of multi levels that have been incorporated in the transmitted
CW, they would be removed first and then decoded. The decoded signals of the tag is
shown in Figure 6.19. The Tag decoded ID is shown in Figure 6.20. The high amplitude
signal represents 1 and low amplitude signal represents 0.
8For standard UHF RFID message exchange see Figure 2.6 in Section 2.1.4.
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Figure 6.18: Tag’s response at the receiver side
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Figure 6.19: Tag’s decoded messages
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Figure 6.20: 14-bit Tag’s ID. The high amplitude signal represents 1 and low amplitude
signal represents 0
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Chapter 7
Security Analysis and Robustness
Against Existing Attacks
In this chapter, we give a thorough security analysis for DSB Enc scheme. Section 7.1
defines the adversary model for our system. In Section 7.3, we present an implementation
of level generator for generating multiple levels using LFSRs and NLFSRs and also provide
a thorough security analysis for level generator. In Section 7.4 and 7.5, we provide two dif-
ferent methods of generating multi-levels using extension filed GF (2p) and and a feedback
shift register. In Section 7.7, we provide a thorough cryptographic security analysis for
DSB Enc scheme. We will also analyse the robustness of proposed scheme from different
existing attacks and measures to prevent them.
7.1 Adversary Model
We assumed that the eavesdropper can listen to all the communications between the reader
Rˇ and tag Tˇ. Eve has the knowledge of the channel and the carrier frequency and can
acquire/intercept the transmitted data from tag to reader communication using passive
eavesdropping. We do not consider active eavesdropper in our system who can either
inject/modify messages in the channel or can jam the communications. The goal of a
passive eavesdropper in our system is to acquire/intercept the messages transmitted from
tag to reader and try to demodulate and decode them. He can move around or stay steady
if he wants to. He can also exploit the level generator used in our system. We assume only
one attacker in the system.
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7.2 Security Model
We assume that the reader and tag are legitimate and are not compromised. Since Ad-
versary A´ can acquire/intercept the communication from tag to reader, we assume carrier
frequency is known to the attacker. Therefore security of the system lies in the baseband
signal. The security of our system is independent of the modulating carrier frequency, i.e.,
LF, HF and UHF. A´ can control the communications which makes him capable of doing
the following actions:
• Passive Eavesdropping: A´ intercepts tag to reader signals, demodulates and de-
code to get transmitted messages.
• Active Eavesdropping: A´ actively sends strong signal towards the tag and get the
information as discussed in [10]. We implemented spectrum sensing in the reader so
it can detect the presence of active eavesdropper in the system. This attack violates
our assumptions made to DSB-Enc thus is not considered here.
• Replay Attack: A´ listen to the communication between reader and the tag for
many sessions. Later replay the previously collected data to the legitimate reader to
breach the security of the system.
• Relay Attack: In relay attack an A´ places an active relaying devices in between
a reader and a tag, which generates new signals to answer the Rˇ according to the
format of backscatter modulation after querying the Tˇ.
• Brute force Attack: A´ searches for the required key by looking through a whole
search space.
7.3 Level Generators implemented by LFSRs and NLF-
SRs
In this section, we will do the security analysis of the LFSRs used in DSB Enc for generating
levels. We have consider that the attacker know the system’s structure and the only thing
that he does not know is the initial seeds (keys) of the LFSRs and the frequency at the
particular time that has been used to communicate because we used frequency hopping to
transmit the levels of amplitudes. In our system, we are updating the seeds (keys) and
changing the carrier’s frequency after every session.
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For the proof-of-concept, we have used two LFSRs, i.e., LFSR1 and LFSR2 with
primitive polynomials of degrees 29 and 31 respectively. We simulated our system model
using many LFSRs in combinatorial generator fashion.
7.3.1 Combinatorial Generator using Multiple LFSRs
Period of Generated Sequence: Pseudorandom sequence generators (PRSG) are not
truly random number generators. They generate random numbers based on deterministic
algorithms. Their security lies in the repetition of the sequences they produce. Linear
feedback shift registers (LFSRs) based on primitive polynomials of degree n produce long
sequences of period 2n−1. In our system, we had produced sequences from a combinatorial
generator from LFSR1 and LFSR2 [20]. The produced sequence has a period of (2
29 −
1)(231 − 1) which will repeat after ≈ 4633 years if clocked at 8 Mhz (USB 2.0 bus speed
used in USRP-1). Based on our requirements for RFID communication, this sequence is
long enough to secure all the communications without repeating.
Linear Span Attack: If we consider that Eve knows some information about the key
streams bits ki of the system. He can create a system of linear equations of multi-variables
and try to solve a set of equations to get the initial seed (key)1 of the system. The
uncertainty or entropy of LFSRs used in the system is measured in term of numbers of bits
of key κ in the internal stages of LFSRs. In level generator the total number of internal
states are 60-bits. The internal stage of the system can be written in an algebraic form:
an = a0 + f(a1, a2, a3, ..., an−1) (7.1)
where an is the feedback bit and f is the linear function. Higher degree polynomials are
secure from linear span attack on LFSR.
Berlekamp Massey Algorithm: To find the short LFSR to produce the same sequence,
an attacker needs twice the length of the key stream bits to launch Berlekamp Massey
Algorithm [11]. In LFSR based level generator, attacker needs 120 consecutive bits to
launch an attack.
Brute force Attack: In the worse case scenario, the time complexity of exhaustive search
is 260 and average time complexity is 230 which can be considered secure for low cost RFID
systems.
1According to Kerckhoffs’ principle, the security of the system depends only on the secrecy of the key
κ
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Conclusion
• Advantages: LFSRs are efficient to implement in hardware as well as software.
They can generate guaranteed maximum large sequences.
• Disadvantages: Since Linear Feedback Shift Registers are not very secure against
different cryptanalytic attacks, hence we can use Non-Linear feedback Shift Registers
for pseudorandom sequence generators with proven security against cryptanalytic
attacks.
7.3.2 Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR)
NLFSR generators do not exhibit the same randomness properties as LFSRs do. Thanks
to span n sequences generated from NLFSR. They have known randomness properties,
i.e., maximum period 2n − 1, balanced sequence, ideal n-tuple distribution and have large
linear span [37].
7.3.3 Span n Sequences Generated from NLFSR
In this section we present two different span n sequences which can be used to produce
levels of amplitude. Furthermore, we analyse the span n sequences structure for security
analysis. The following two span n sequences are discovered in [36, 37]
Span n sequences of stage n = 20: Span n sequences generated from NLFSR of degree
20 has a period of 220 − 1 and a linear span of 220 − 2. The recurrence relation of span n
sequences of stage n = 20 is
an+k = ak +WG(X
d
k ), k ≥ 0 (7.2)
where n is the number of stages, WG is the WG transformation and d is the decimation
of the sequence. The WG transformation as follows
WG(Xdk ) = f(xr1 , xr2 , xr3 , xr4 , xr5) (7.3)
where r1, r2, r3, r4, r5 are the tap positions and (x0, ..., xn−1) are variables for NLFSR.
For a span n sequence of stage n = 20 for nonlinear WG transformation with d = 1
and the tap positions are (5,10,12,18,19). The WG transformation is given by
f(x5, x10, x12, x18, x19) = x5 + x18 + x5x10 + x5x12+
x5x18 + x5x19 + x10x12 + x10x18 + x10x19 + x12x19+
x5x10x18 + x5x10x19 + x5x12x18 + x5x18x19 + x10x12x19
(7.4)
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a19 a18 …. …. …. …. …. a2 a1 a0 
WG 
Figure 7.1: The block diagram of span n sequence from NLFSR of degree 20
By using Eq. (7.2) and (7.3)
a20+k = ak + f(ak+5, ak+10, ak+12, ak+18, ak+19) (7.5)
A Block diagram of span n sequence from NLFSR of degree 20 is shown in Figure 7.1.
Span n sequences of stage n = 23: The second NLFSR used in level generator for
producing PSRG is Span n sequence generated from NLFSR of degree 23 having a period
of 223−1 and a linear span of 223−2. The recurrence relation of span n sequences of stage
n = 23 is given by [36]
an+k = ak +WG1(X
d
k ) +WG2(Y
d
k ), k ≥ 0 (7.6)
where n is the number of stages, both WG1 and WG2 are WG transformations and d is
the decimation of the sequence, given by (7.3).
For span n sequence of stage n = 23, WG1 and WG2 are given by
WG1(x22, x21, x20, x19, x16) = x22 + x21 + x20 + x19 + x16+
x21x20 + x21x19 + x20x16
(7.7)
WG2(x15, x11, x9, x7, x3) = x15 + x7 + x15x11 + x15x9+
x15x7 + x15x3 + x11x7 + x11x3 + x9x7 + x15x11x3+
x15x9x7 + x15x7x3 + x11x9x7 + x11x9x3+
x11x7x3 + x9x7x3 + x11x9x7x3
(7.8)
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a22 a21 …. …. …. …. …. a2 a1 a0 
WG1 WG2 
Figure 7.2: The block diagram of span n sequence from NLFSR of degree 23
where WG1 corresponds d=15 and tap positions (16,19,20,21,22) and WG2, d= 11 and
tap positions (3,7,9,11,15). A Block diagram of span n sequence from NLFSR of degree 23
is shown in Figure 7.2. For details of span n sequences generated by WG transformations,
see [37].
Security Analysis of NLFSRs: Replacing both the LFSRs in the level generator with
aforementioned NLFSR in this section. We can generate the same levels with much better
security. NLFSRs are more resistant to different types of attacks to which LFSRs are prone
to.
Brute Force Attack: The time complexity of exhaustive search for the span n sequences
generated from NLFSRs of degree 20 and 23 is 243.
Berlekamp Massey Algorithm: In NLFSRs based level generator an attacker need
224.17 consecutive bits to launch an attack.
Algebraic Attack: The algebraic immunity of NLFSR span n sequences are very large.
So they are immune to most of the known algebraic attacks.
7.3.4 Security Analysis of Level Generator using (N)LFSRs
Because of using decimal addition operator for combining the bits produced in level gen-
erator from each PRSG to create different levels of amplitudes, the fundamental property
63
of PRSG is destroyed. Bits produced from each LFSRs were independent and identically
distributed random values but the generated levels are not equally distributed throughout
the sequence.
Example
Table 7.1: Levels generated using 2-PRSGs
PRSG1 PRSG2 Levels
-1 -1 -2
-1 1 0
1 -1 0
1 1 2
Table 7.2: Levels generated using 3-PRSGs
PRSG1 PRSG2 PRSG3 Levels
-1 -1 -1 -3
-1 -1 1 -1
-1 1 -1 -1
-1 1 1 1
1 -1 -1 -1
1 -1 1 1
1 1 -1 1
1 1 1 3
We can calculate the probabilities of each levels produced through multiple PRSGs
given in Table 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.
From Table 7.1, {-2,0,2} has probability distribution of {1
4
, 1
2
, 1
4
}. Similarly from Table
7.2 and 7.3, {-3,-1,1,3} and {-4,-2,0,2,4} has the probability distribution of {1
8
, 3
8
, 3
8
, 1
8
} and
{ 1
16
, 4
16
, 6
16
, 4
16
, 1
16
} respectively.
Conclusion: An attacker can exploit this discrepancy to retrieve the information sent
between Rˇ and Tˇ. Though attacker still needs to overcome the synchronization problem to
cancel the levels from the received signal.
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Table 7.3: Levels generated using 4-PRSGs
PRSG1 PRSG2 PRSG3 PRSG4 Levels
-1 -1 -1 -1 -4
-1 -1 -1 1 -2
-1 -1 1 -1 -2
-1 -1 1 1 0
-1 1 -1 -1 -2
-1 1 -1 1 0
-1 1 1 -1 0
-1 1 1 1 2
1 -1 -1 -1 -2
1 -1 -1 1 0
1 -1 1 -1 0
1 -1 1 1 2
1 1 -1 -1 0
1 1 -1 1 2
1 1 1 -1 2
1 1 1 1 4
7.4 Level Generation Using Extension Field GF (2p)
To secure the information sent in the channel, we need to generate multi-levels which are
independent and identically distributed random variables.
We can produce the multi-levels using LFSR over the Extension Field GF (2p), p ≥ 2.
The number levels produces are equal to 2p. To demonstrate the feasibility of using LFSR
over GF (23), we present the simple structure of level generator over extension field.
7.4.1 LFSR over GF (23)
Let GF (23) be defined by a primitive polynomial
f(x) = x3 + x+ 1 over F23 (7.9)
and let α be the root of f(x). A feedback function of a 11- stage LFSR is given by
f(x) = x11 + αx10 + x8 + x7 + x6 + (α2 + 1)x5 + x4 + x3 + α2x+ α (7.10)
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Recurrence relation of Eq. (7.10) is given by
ak+11 = αak+10 + ak+8 + ak+7 + ak+6 + (α
2 + 1)ak+5 + ak+4 + ak+3 + α
2ak+1 + αak
k = 0, 1, ....
a10 a9 a8 a7 a6 a5 a4 a3 a2 a1 a0 
∝ ∝ ∝+1 ∝2 
Figure 7.3: The block diagram of an 11-stage LFSR over F23
7.4.2 Security Analysis
• Period of the generated sequences of 11- stage LFSR over F23 is 233 − 1.
• Linear Complexity is 11.
• Number of levels generated are 8.
Conclusion: The levels of amplitude generated using extension field are independent
and identically distributed random values but performing operations over extension field
is expensive and slow.
7.5 Multilevel of Amplitude using FSRs
In this section we propose another method of producing levels in level generator using
FSR(linear/non-linear) over GF (2). The hardware efficient structure of producing inde-
pendent and identically distributed levels through PRSG using single FSR with a buffer
is shown in Figure 7.4 which can be extended to multiple LFSRs or NLSFR for better
security.
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an an-1 …. …. …. …. …. a2 a1 a0 
f 
buffer 
Figure 7.4: The block diagram of i.i.d level generator using FSR
7.5.1 Encoder
The 2-bit buffer can produce 4 i.i.d levels.
Table 7.4: Encoding of 2 bits
a1 a0 r f(r) = 2r − 3
0 0 0 -3
0 1 1 -1
1 0 2 1
1 1 3 3
r(a1, a0) = 2.a1 + a0 (7.11)
The probability distribution of levels is uniform. 2-bit buffer generate each level with a
probability of {1
4
}. Similarly, the 3-bit buffer produce 8 i.i.d levels. In general, for an
n-stage FSR
r =
n−1∑
i=0
2iai (7.12)
and the number of levels generated by FSR is given by
number of levels = 2n (7.13)
where n is the size of buffer in bits. A general encoding rule is given by
E(an−1...a0) = 2r − (2n − 1) (7.14)
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Table 7.5: Encoding of 3 bits
a2 a1 a0 r f(r) = 2r − 7
0 0 0 0 -7
0 0 1 1 -5
0 1 0 2 -3
0 1 1 3 -1
1 0 0 4 1
1 0 1 5 3
1 1 0 6 5
1 1 1 7 7
7.5.2 Decoder
Decoding of 4-levels is given by
r =
f(r) + 3
2
(7.15)
Table 7.6: Decoding of 3 bits
Received Levels r
-3 0
-1 1
1 2
3 3
A general decoding rule is given by
r =
f(r) + (2n − 1)
2
(7.16)
7.5.3 Security Analysis
• Balanced Sequence
• Probability of each level
The levels produced though this method are uniformly distributed. The probability
of each level is given by 1
2n
.
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Size of Buffer Number of 1’s Number of 0’s
1− bit 2n−1 2n−1 − 1
2− bit 2n−2 2n−2 − 1
3− bit 2n−3 2n−3 − 1
x− bit 2n−x 2n−x − 1
• Period
Period of generated level sequence is same as generating FSR.
Conclusion: The uniform multilevel generator using FSR are hardware efficient and low
cost method to securely generate and transmit different level. The single FSR in the
aforementioned method can be replaced with the NLFSRs described previously in this
chapter. The general encoding and decoding rule presented in multilevel of amplitude
using FSM could be used for uniformly distributing the levels produced using combinatorial
structure of (N)LFSRs as shown in Table 7.1 and 7.2 by replacing the decimal addition
operator with a n-bit buffer.
7.6 Mutual Authentication
For mutual authentication and data transmission between both legitimate parties, DSB
Enc could be employed in two different ways.
• EPC C1 Gen2 standard: The overall communication is accomplished in two
phases. In phase 1, the reader to tag communication follows EPC C1 Gen2 standard
and sends query command without adding any levels of amplitudes to the carrier
wave. Then, instead of sending the continuous wave followed by the reader com-
mand, the reader would add multiple levels to the carrier based on DSB Enc. In
phase 2, the tag will decode the reader’s command by again following the EPC C1
Gen2 standard but replies on DSB Enc scheme. The reader will decode tag’s re-
sponse using same DSB Enc scheme. No additional cost is required at reader’s or
tag’s side.
• Non-standard data transmission: DSB Enc is used for secure reader to tag and
tag to reader communication. A pre-shared master key or seed is required at both
sides of the system for establishing a secure communication channel. Depending on
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the tag’s computational capability, the DSB Enc could be implemented on tag’s side
by using different level generation schemes that have been proposed previously in
this chapter to interpret the reader’s data. However to generate multiple levels for
tag to reader communication and the tag requires additional hardware to support
DSB Enc.
7.6.1 Trade-off between Low Cost and High Security
All methods and techniques described in this chapter are focused on low cost and efficient
hardware as well as software implementation. For higher security, FSR for producing
multilevel amplitudes can be replaced with stream cipher and block cipher in counter
mode, i.e., 128-bit AES or Blum Blum Shub (BBS) [11].
7.7 Robustness Against Different Attacks
In this section, we will show the robustness of DSB Enc scheme against different attacks
on RFID systems.
7.7.1 Test of Passive Eavesdropping
We transmitted the data from Tˇ to Rˇ in the presence of passive eavesdropper and tried to
retrieve the UID sent by the Tˇ. We considered two sceneries for the passive eavesdropping
attack shown in Figure 7.5.
(a) When Eve ξ is near the Rˇ (b) When Eve ξ is near the Tˇ
Figure 7.5: Passive Eavesdropping
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Passive Receiver: We used an USRP N210 embedded with an RFX900 daughterboard
carrying a VERT900 vertical antenna effective in a range of 824 - 960 MHz [58]. We
developed a signal flow graph on GNU Radio Companion to enable this receiver to passively
receive the information at 915 MHz from the channel without being detected by the system.
Furthermore, passive receiver E´ is connected to a Sony Vaio VPCEB33FD laptop using
with UHD driver.
Scenario-I: In first scenario, we received the signal sent from the Tˇ to the Rˇ by placing
passive eavesdropper E´ near the Rˇ.
Figure 7.6: Signal received by passive eavesdropper in scenario-I
Scenario-II: We received the signal by placing passive eavesdropper E´ near the Tˇ.
Testing Results: In testing, we applied different filters and noise reduction techniques on
passively receive data to retrieve the UID sent by the Tˇ but all attempts were unsuccessful
in both scenarios. We were able to securely transmit and decode the UID on the legitimate
Rˇ’s side.
The signal received by the passive eavesdropper in scenario-I and II are shown in Figures
7.6 and 7.7. Both figures show that Eve gets constant (flat) power spectrum in the received
signal which is a spectrum of a white noise. So passive eavesdropper gets nothing but a
noise. The best retrieval(decoded) graph on the passive eavesdropper side is shown in
Figure 7.8 in scenario-II. The decoded signal at the legitimate reader is shown in 6.19 in
Chapter 6.
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Figure 7.7: Signal received by passive eavesdropper in scenario-II
Figure 7.8: Message decoded by passive Eavesdropper
Security against Passive Eavesdropping
Rˇ sent levels of amplitude si with continuous wave ci towards Tˇ. Tˇ received signal ri which
is given by
ri(t) = (si(t) + ci(t)) cos(2pifit+ θ) + n(t) (7.17)
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where n(t) is the channel noise and fi is the UHF carrier hopping frequency. Tˇ reply with
the UID with ASK modulation given by
r′i(t) = Ari(t) + n
′(t) (7.18)
Comments
Passive eavesdropper (ξ) gets signal r′i , from the received signal. Eve (ξ) tries to recover
the UID as well as levels of amplitudes. There are two major difficulties in launching
passive eavesdropping.
1. To get the UID sent by the Tˇ Eve first need to recover levels of amplitudes. For the
ASK signal for RFID tag, 0 represents the same levels of amplitude and 1 increases
all the levels. But it is hard to distinguish whether the resultant has been modified
by 0 or 1. The following example demonstrates this property.
Example: We may assume that Eve has no knowledge of the generated levels.
Levels generated by Rˇ are S = {...,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,...}. When Tˇ responses with 0
all the levels will remain the same as sent by the reader Rˇ, i.e., S = {...,-3,-2,-
1,0,1,2,3,...}. Otherwise the set S becomes {...,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,4,...}, which is obtained
by adding 1 to each level of the transmitted signal S.
As each transmitted symbol contains many set of generated levels. It hard for an
Eve to distinguish where Tˇ’s response has been added to the send signal.
2. We may assume Eve recovers the levels of amplitude. However to get the UID Eve
needs to remove all the levels in the same manner as they were added. The following
example demonstrates this property.
Example: Lets, from Table 7.7, uid 6= (ξ)uid′.
Table 7.7: Example
s 5 -2 1 7 -5 2 6 ... ...
uid 2 5 4 3 1 2 7 ... ...
r′ 7 3 5 10 -4 4 13 ... ...
(ξ)s 5 -2 1 7 -5 2 6
(ξ)uid′ 10 8 3 11 8 ... ...
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Assume Eve gets s to recover uid. Eve needs to remove all levels from the same starting
point as they were added with same data rate and timings. This is a synchronization
problem. As Rˇ knows the staring point in the received signal’s sample set, Rˇ can decode
the uid by cancelling at the added levels. Hence DSB Enc scheme is secure from passive
eavesdropping.
7.7.2 Secure Against Replay Attack
In replay attack, an adversary A´ gets signal r′ at time t which he tries to replay to the
Rˇ at time (t + τ). As per DSB Enc scheme, we are continuously updating the key every
session, so the key that has been used previously at time t would be different than the one
used at time (t+ τ) which makes DSB Enc scheme resistant to replay attacks.
7.7.3 Secure Against Relay Attack
NFC enabled devices: Most of the low cost relay attacks are initiated with NFC enabled
phones using ISO 14443 [62]. ISO 14443 type A uses Manchester Coding with 10% ASK
and Modified Miller with 100% ASK while type B uses NRZ-L encoding with 10% ASK
[52]. These schemes are used in active and passive modes. According to ISO NFC standard,
NFC devices can only capture and transmit two levels. NFC devices would map multi-levels
to 1 or 0. Since NFC enabled devices cannot catch and transmit multilevel amplitudes,
they can not initiate relay attacks those mentioned in [17, 19].
Expensive analogue devices: If A´ uses an expensive device for such kind of attacks
instead of NFC enabled phone, it would capture the analogue signal that has been trans-
mitted. To retransmit the same signal to it other devices located near the vicinity of the
tag, it must either re-sample it to the same digital sample rate as it was before or send the
analogue signal directly. For the former case, since the sampling rate is unknown to the
attacker, he cannot perform the re-sampling, i.e., the sample rate here is the bit-rate and
symbol-rate of the produced levels of amplitudes using DSB Enc which can be standard-
ized by randomly choosing the bit rate and symbol rate for each session. 2. For the later
case, it requires an expensive powerful antenna/amplifier.
Conclusion: This makes DSB Enc scheme secure against relay attacks from low cost
NFC enabled devices, but it is somewhat secure against expensive analogue relay devices,
which are neither practical nor can be detected easily.
2This sample rate is different and independent from the tag’s symbol rate.
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7.8 Summary and Comparisons
Conventional RFID systems suffer from various attacks. Many schemes and cryptographic
algorithms have been proposed to secure RFID communication. But all of those schemes
are prone to various types of attacks on different layers. Not any single scheme provides
the solution against all existing attacks without increasing the cost or removing the salient
features of RFID passive tags.
Savry et al. [1, 44] have proposed a physical layer scheme named RFID Noisy Reader
in which they used a separate hardware for generating 8-bit noise level on the physical
layer to secure tag to reader and reader to tag communications. In their scheme, the Eve
can decode the tag’s reply if Eve is closer to the tag or the reader and it creates a problem
for the legitimate reader to decode the tag’s reply if they are far apart due to tremendous
increase in bit-error-rate (BER).
DSB Enc provides a lightweight, low-cost and practically secure physical layer security
to the RFID system, for a supply chain processing application, without increasing the
computational power and tag’s cost. In comparison to Noisy Reader, we have generated
different levels before transmission of the signal. Our implementation and experimental
results validate that DSB Enc is secure against passive eavesdropping, replay and relay
attacks. It provides better results in the presence of AWGN channel. DSB Enc scheme is
a special case of [67].
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter summarizes the contributions of the thesis and provides potential future
applications and directions for future work that are still need to be done.
In chapter 1, we have given the introduction of RFID and briefly describe the security
and privacy concerns related to RFID systems. In Chapter 2, we presented fundamentals,
and background information related to RFID systems. We have described the basic ar-
chitecture of RFID system. Furthermore in the chapter, we have explained physical layer
characteristics(encoding and modulation schemes) of RFID used in different standards.
We also presented several attacks on RFID systems. In Chapter 3, we have defined the
list of notations, definitions and fundamental background information essential for later
chapters. In Chapter 4, we have given the historical background and evolution of software
radio and software defined radio, GNU Radio and USRP. We also discussed the need and
importance of SDR in the modern communication era. In Chapter 5, we have reviewed
various physical layer techniques, that are present in literature and are used for securing
RFID communications. In Chapter 6, we have introduced our new physical layer scheme
named DSB Enc using multilevel generator. We provided the system model, simulation
model, preliminary simulation results and illustrated the principle of level generator. Sim-
ulations were conducted on GNU Radio Companion. We have validated the feasibility of
our new efficient scheme by conducting experiments using software defined radio (SDR)
and a WISP tag. In Chapter 7, we have given a thorough security analysis and provided
the results of passive eavesdropping on DSB Enc scheme.
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8.1 Contributions
Proposed Scheme
In this thesis, we proposed a lightweight, low-cost and practically secure physical layer
security to the RFID system, for a supply chain processing application, without increasing
the computational power and tag’s cost. The proposed scheme was validated by simulations
on GNU Radio and experimentation using SDR and a WISP tag. Our implementation and
experimental results validate that DSB Enc is secure against passive eavesdropping, replay
and relay attacks. It provides better results in the presence of AWGN channel.
Simulation Results Part I
In first part of simulation results, we have shown that we could recover the sent signal in
the presence of AWGN channel as long as we know the levels of amplitudes added at the
time of transmission. We can remove all the levels precisely at the receiver side regardless
of the amplitudes of those levels.
Simulation Results Part II
In second part of simulation results, we have shown a method to increase the transmitted
signal’s power by adding the levels of amplitude and data signal in different frequency
bands. This method follows the concept of double sideband large carrier (DSB-LC) ampli-
tude modulation. As added levels in different frequency band do not carry any information,
therefore it is a trade off between spectral efficiency and long range.
Level Generator
In our proposed scheme, the reader has been modified for signal generation by using multi-
ple LFSRs which produce different signal levels and each level is encoded using NRZ-L. The
encoded signal levels are discrete and are made continuous by adding them to a continuous
constant wave which tends to be a Gaussian distribution. This will assure that the tag
gets uninterrupted power supply. The resultant wave is modulated on a carrier frequency
902-928 MHz using MPSK. The channel is an additive white Gaussian as well. Since the
linear combination of two independent Gaussians is a Gaussian, therefore the transmitted
signal becomes Gaussian.
To transmit the message to the reader, the passive tag modulates a resistive or ca-
pacitive load at its antenna and adds its response to the carrier signal using ASK. The
resultant is still Gaussian. So if Eve picks the tag’s reply, he will get a Gaussian signal
which is hard to decode without a priori knowledge of the levels generated by the reader.
Therefore only the legitimate reader can decode the tag’s reply by subtracting the levels
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at the reader side. Another obstacle for an eavesdropper is the synchronization problem
of levels generated at the time of transmission.
Proof-of-Concept
We have given the proof-of-concept by practically implementing our proposed scheme using
SDR and passive tag. From the experimental results, it can be concluded that the proposed
scheme provides light weight,low cost and practically secure physical layer security to the
RFID system.
Robustness Against Various Attacks
In Chapter 6, we have defined the adversary model for our system, presented cryptographic
security analysis for the proposed scheme and provided several methods for generating
multiple levels from level generator. We also analysed the robustness of proposed scheme
against various existing attacks and suggested measures to prevent them.
8.2 Future Work
In future, we would like to perform active eavesdropping and colluded passive eavesdropper
attack to further validate the feasibility of proposed scheme and use in real applications.
In this thesis, we discussed the possibility of secure transmission at the physical layer for
communication model comprising of one legitimate reader, one valid tag and a single passive
eavesdropper. We would like to generalize this scheme with efficient encoding schemes
and more complex communication models encompassing several passive eavesdropper with
multi-user channel environment.
Our proposed scheme can be used for various future applications e.g. key transportation
and symmetric key distribution.
1. Key transportation: As our proposed scheme provides secure physical layer proto-
col for sending UID of passive tag on vulnerable channel, we would like to extend the
proposed scheme to securely transport the key from passive or active tag to reader
channel using multi-level amplitudes in the future.
2. Symmetric key distribution: We would also like to enhance our proposed scheme
to be used for symmetric key distribution which would be independent of the location
and time invariant channel conditions and will be implemented on the physical layer
of the OSI model.
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The proposed scheme has verified potential of implementing many other applications but
there is a lot of research that still needs to be done.
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